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Kaufman, Anne L . , M.A., July 1994

English

"Ever so Many Generations Hence": Rereading People vs. Abbot
(1837)
Director: Nancy Cook
In this paper I hope to open a discussion of how the
language the legal system uses to discuss women's sexuality
began to evolve. How has it happened, for example, that the
language used in a particular rape case, People v. Abbot, 19
Wend 192 (1838) can appear in a discussion of the language
of women's sexuality? While it may seem overly focused to
consider one such case in depth, as historians have noted,
legal (and cultural) attitudes toward women in the United
States evolved at local and state levels as the new country
began the process of defining itself. One case, then, can
provide a small but effective picture of developing
attitudes toward women (as well of the history of rape law).
The opinion written by Judge Esek Cowen for the court in
Abbot takes pains to set forth the author's concept of
appropriate female sexuality. The bulk of the opinion
focuses on this matter, while the case itself turns on a
point of law that makes 90% of the opinion irrelevant to the
disposition of the case. It would be a mistake, however, to
see Judge Cowen's discursiveness as a unique event; the law
is shaped by dicta as much as by statute, and Cowen was
neither the first nor the last judge to use a court opinion
as an op-ed piece. It is Cowen's choice of language, and the
frequency with which this case is cited in subsequent rape
cases, that makes Abbot an interesting and useful moment to
consider in the discourse on female sexuality.
On first reading, Cowen's opinion seemed both
anachronistic and appalling. Closer inspection and the
research involved in building a context around this case,
reveal a longstanding tradition of resistance to the
attitudes Cowen espouses. Certain nineteenth century women
writers, such as Elizabeth Stoddard, used their fiction to
initiate such a pattern of resistance, while others, such as
Susan Warner, lined up in Esek Cowen's camp. The Abbot case
thus becomes useful not only as interpretive possibility
inherent in its text, but as a starting point from which to
begin a wider-ranging investigation of the development of
rape law, of the language men and women use to talk about
women's sexuality, and of the culture we inhabit.
11
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It avails not, time nor place— distance avails
not,
I am with you, you men and women of a generation,
or ever so many generations hence.
Just as you feel when you
look on the river and
sky, so I felt,
Just as any one of you is one of alivingcrowd, I
was one of
a crowd. . . .
"Crossing Brooklyn Ferry"
Walt Whitman

IV
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INTRODUCTION
Last Spring I read several chapters of my father's
biography of Justice Benjamin Cardozo^. I came to a section
that treats Cardozo's participation in the case People v.
Carey, 223 N.Y. 519.

Cardozo's comments on this case, in an

unpublished memo, lit a bulb over my head, just like in the
comic strips— his words resonated with some of my own work
on the representation of desire and sexuality in the works
of some nineteenth-century American women writers. Although
it may seem problematic to modern scholars, nineteenthcentury rape opinions do expound upon women's sexuality at
great length. Rape was not yet entirely (or at all)
separable from sexual intercourse in the cultural
vocabulary, and issues of consent complicated the issue as
well. I began to search for a rape case more contemporary
with the works of fiction with which I was already engaged.
In People v. Abbot (19 Wend. 192), a case dealing with rape
charges brought by Philena Morehouse against the preacher
who held her indentures, Orson Abbot, I found everything I
could have hoped for and more. The case was tried before the
local Court of General Sessions, and was heard, on appeal,
by the Supreme Court of Judicature of the state of New York
in 18382. The opinion issued by Judge Esek Cowen for the
Supreme Court of Judicature serves as a window into a
particular nineteenth-century perspective on female
sexuality. Cowen's language, as I will show, offers a wealth
of interpretive possibility, and can be regarded as the
5
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starting point for a fruitful inquiry into the development
of the language men and women use to talk about women’s
sexuality.
It may seem unusual to come at legal research from a
literature background, but this background gives me a
different perspective on the issues of language and textual
analysis, and allows me to bring a different critical
perspective to bear on the material.
In nineteenth-century women's writing, discussions of
women's sexuality appear within the context of narrative and
plot, and are seldom approached directly. The elaborate
encoding of sexual desire contrasts starkly with the blunt
dichotomies presented in nineteenth-century rape case
opinions. In this paper I hope to open a discussion of how
the language the legal system uses to discuss women's
sexuality began to evolve, contrasting it with the language
women writers used to treat the same subject. It seems odd
and jarring that the language used in a rape case can appear
in a discussion of the language of women's sexuality. This
combination is a moral and philosophical conflation with its
roots in the evolving republican ideology of post
revolutionary America.
While it may seem overly focused to consider one such
case in depth, as Joan Hoff Wilson has noted, legal (and
cultural) attitudes toward women "did not emerge full-blown
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with only sporadic Supreme Court decisions. They evolved
structurally substantively at local and state levels after
1787".3 One case, then, can provide a small but effective
picture of developing attitudes toward women (as well of the
history of rape law).
Judge Cowen's opinion takes pains to set forth his
concept of appropriate female sexuality.^ The bulk of the
opinion focuses on this matter, while the case itself turns
on a procedural issue that makes ninety percent of the
opinion irrelevant to the disposition of the case^. it would
be a mistake, however, to see Cowen's discursiveness as a
unique event; the law is shaped by dicta

as much as by

statute, and Cowen was neither the first nor the last judge
to use a court opinion as an op-ed piece. It is Cowen's
choice of language, and the frequency with which this case
is cited in subsequent rape cases^, that makes Abbot

an

interesting and useful moment to consider in the discourse
on female sexuality.

Given the fact that Lyons and Sodus, the towns in which
the attacks alleged in People v. Abbot

occurred, are only

15-25 miles from Seneca Falls, New York, I had hoped to be
able to investigate the influence that the events leading up
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to the Seneca Falls convention in 1848 may have had on Judge
Cowen and his attitudes toward women, but so far I have been
unable to find primary sources with which to begin this
discussion.

And contemporary transportation issues may well

make direct influence a moot point. It seems very neat that
Lyons and Sodus are so close to Seneca Falls, but by 1830s
standards 20 miles is not close. Although the Erie Canal, a
significant advance in transportation, was completed in
1825, and the federal government actively encouraged the
growth of the railroads and westward expansion, the state of
the roads in western New York State at that time meant that
it was close to a full day's trip from Lyons to Seneca
Falls^ . In 1816, President James Madison and Congressman
John C. Calhoun battled over a bill that would have provided
federal funds for local roads: Madison vetoed Calhoun's
bill, "adamantly insisting that it was unconstitutional"® .
And the telegraph did not become a significant factor in
communication until the middle of the nineteenth century.
This essay is a step in my ongoing effort to build a
context for understanding the culture we live in today. I
hope that this brief take on a complex subject will provide
an interesting opening to a fascinating discourse. And where
better to find nineteenth-century men writing about women's
sexuality than in rape case opinions?^
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A broad study of rape opinions, placed next to an
equally comprehensive study of women's writing on sexuality,
will begin to offer a set of ideas about the way women's and
men's language about women and their sexuality has evolved
along such different paths in the past 150 years. It is,
however, a huge task, and one that I do not propose to
undertake in this space- The work of this essay, then,

will

be to rebuild the context around a rape case I see as
particularly problematic:The People v. Orson Abbot .

This

case resulted in a conviction at the local level and was
reversed on the procedural issue that the Court of General
Sessions had no jurisdiction to try a rape case.
I also hope to give a brief overview of women writing
fiction that dealt with issues of on women's sexuality at
roughly the same time in order to frame the investigation of
two such different discourses^®.
^ Biography of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, by Andrew L. Kaufman,
forthcoming from Harvard University Press.
^ Under statehood, until the judicial reorganization of 1847, the
Supreme Court of Judicature was the State's highest court of law
possessing original jurisdiction The Constitution of 1822 changed the
organization of the Supreme Court. The number of justices was reduced
from five to three. The Governor now appointed the justices, with Senate
approval. The state was divided into eight judicial circuits, each
presided over by an appointive circuit judge. These circuit judges
presided over civil trials in the circuit courts and criminal trials in
the courts of oyer and terminer
from
>uely & Constantly Kept,
a
publication of the New York State Archives, p.5.
^ Joan Hoff Wilson, Hidden Riches; Legal Records and Women, 1750-1825
in Woman's Being, Woman's Place: Female Identity and Vocation in
American History , Mary Kelley, e d . , Boston: G. K. Hall & Co., 1979, p.
14. Subsequent references will be cited parenthetically in the text.
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^There are opinions in 19th century rape cases which do not exhibit the
forceful and colorful language of Judge Cowen, in People v. Abbot
(1837). One in particular is Judge Strong's opinion in People v. Jackson
(1857), which exhibits a sensibility (perhaps informed by the debate
leading up to the Seneca Falls convention in 1848) that is both
openminded and humane.
^Quite simply, the case was tried before a court that did not have
jurisdiction.
° Shephard's Citations lists over sixty cases and several law review
articles which cite Abbot: each of the law review articles cites the
case in reference to the admissibility of character evidence.
^ Thanks to Brooke Masters for providing this information, including a
citation to Liberty & Union, by David Herbert Donald, Lexington, MA and
Toronto; D.C. Heath & Company, 1978, pages 4 and 6.
® A People & A Nation: A History of the United States, Brief Edition,
Mary Beth Norton, David M. Katzman, et al., Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1988, p. 147.
^ It certainly seems possible that looking at texts of sermons would
also be useful to this endeavor— but I am not going to do that for this
paper.
T. Walter Herbert’s Dearest Beloved: The Hawthornes and the Making of
the Middle-Class Family
(Berkeley: University of California Press,
1993) will be useful as part of this discussion, too— certainly
Nathaniel Hawthorne was the published writer, but Sophia's experiences
with negotiating sexuality and desire and other aspects of adult life
bear mentioning in this context.
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America in the 1830s was still very much a country in
the process of defining itself. The years 17 50-182 0 saw
political discourse engaging the middle class, as the
American and

French Revolutions brought the philosophies of

Locke and Rousseau into everyday conversation. Both
countries struggled to develop workable new political
ideologies. Under pressure from these new ideologies, which
stressed the rights of the individual, men found themselves
having to rationalize gender issues for the first time.
Kenneth A. Lockridge states that
in general and most particularly in colonial
contexts, patriarchy was under constant
pressure from many directions— from the
state, financially, culturally, and in
specific cases because of the peculiar
vulnerabilities of colonial situations. From
this perspective, it was not patriarchy's
strengths but rather its very vulnerabilitv
which was vital in maintaining larger
patriarchal urges to political and
ideological control right up through the age
of the democratic revolutions.
The contradictions inherent in Locke and Rousseau's theories
were apparent first at the philosophic level; later they
surfaced at the family level as well. And the contradictions
were not new. One hundred years before the Abbot

case,

Mary Astell was already asking, "If absolute Sovereignty be
not necessary in a State, how comes it to be so in a Family?
Or if in a Family, why not in a State? . . . .

if all

Men

are born Free, how is it that all Women are born Slaves?"^^.
11
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Many historians of the early republic have discussed various
implications of this dilemma, including Susan Moller Okin:
Just as the freedom, individuality, and
rationality of men was beginning to be
recognized as the foundation for their
political and legal equality, a change was
taking place in the sphere of family life
that had catastrophic implications for the
future of women's rights and freedoms. But
the development of the affective or
sentimental family and the idealizing of it
that occurred had serious consequences for
women.(72)
These consequences are apparent in historical
documents, as states which had granted women the right to
vote began disenfranchising female citizens, and in
literature, where Susanna Rowson, followed by Susan Warner,
Lydia Maria Child, E.D.E.N. Southworth, and a host of others
began to branch out from their literary predecessors
(Richardson, Austen, Bronte, the Shelleys) to explore the
possibilities (or lack thereof) for young women in a society
dominated by the the ideal of the Republican Mother. This
paragon,

whose domestic life involved creating an oasis to

which her busy husband might return for sanctuary, and
raising her daughters to do the same, and whose political
responsibilities involved nothing more or less than raising
good republican sons, became the embodiment of all feminine
virtue.
Significantly, there was no sphere for a public
challenge of these contradictions. As Okin says, "anyone who
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wished to register objection to the subordinate position of
women had now to take considerable care not to be branded as
an enemy of that newly hallowed institution— the sentimental
family"(Okin, 88). And Linda Kerber notes that "to accept an
openly acknowledged role for women in the public sector was
to invite extraordinary hostility and ridicule. Although
neither political party took a consistent position on the
matter, hostility to women’s political participation seems
to have been particularly acute in Federalist circles"^3.
This left women, especially middle- and upper-class women,
in a paradoxical bind. Having worked for the Revolution,
often in traditionally male roles, they now, in many cases,
found themselves less free than they had been before the
war, as "the Republican Mother . . . .

was a citizen but not

really a constituent" (Ffomen of the Republic, 283). The new
republic was built on a gendered notion of power and
entitlement.
What does all this suggest about the political climate
of the 1830s in America? The evolving sentimental family
idealized a certain role for women, but left very little
room for negotiation. Working-class women, single women, and
of course women fighting for social reforms such as the
Married Woman's Property Act (finally passed in 1848, the
same year as the convention at Seneca Falls) and
enfranchisement were all beyond the pale of appropriate
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behavior.

For example, when Fanny Wright lectured in the

United States on "equality for women, emancipation for
slaves . . . .

free public education for everyone,

regardless of sex, race, or economic status . . . .she was
denounced as a 'red harlot,' a 'fallen and degraded fair
one'" (Gurko, 33).

Not only did the development of the

idealized sentimental family have serious consequences for
women, it also added another facet to the growing dual
characterization of women: women outside of the sentimental
family were dubious characters sexually, morally, and
politically.
A perfect example of this notion, as Christine Stansell
suggests, is

the Bedlow-Sawyer rape case of 1793: "an

especially valuable source of information about how men
could act out and explain to themselves their hostilities
toward w o m e n " . B e d l o w was charged with the rape of Lanah
Sawyer, a seventeen-year-old seamstress, and his attorneys
used the trial to "shift the focus . . . .from the duplicity
of the seducer to the weak-mindedness of the seduced"
(Stansell, 24). The strategy was successful. Bedlow was
acquitted, although the jury's decision was not universally
popular. Stansell notes that "the intersection of class and
gender . . . .signified a sexual wantonness that weakened
women's credibility" (Stansell, 26), an effect clearly
visible in the Abbot case as well.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

15

Marybeth Hamilton's essay, "'The Life of a Citizen in
the Hands of a Woman,'"15 discusses the fate of workingclass women who brought complaints for rape before the Court
of General Sessions in New York City in the period 1790-1820
generally, and the Bedlow-Sawyer case specifically. While
there are important differences in the two cases (Henry
Bedlow was tried in New York City in 1793, and People v.
Abbot

was brought in the western part of the state thirty-

seven years later) many of Hamilton's conclusions do much to
explicate and inform a reading of Philena Morehouse's
experience.
Hamilton explores the ways class inflects a discussion
of women's sexuality;

"the women of New York's laboring

class . . . .were made the repositories of all the most
venal qualities the city's upper-class women had shed in
their ascent to ladyhood— their insatiable passions and
grasping, greedy brand of treachery" (Hamilton, 233) .
was in no way an implicit action, as
in the rowdy male preserves of saloons and
bawdy houses (terrain frequented by both
gentlemen and laborers), jokes, songs, and
tales depicted poor women as greedy whores
and lusty, manipulative molls, creatures
whose violent passions led them readily to
vengefulness and deceit. In such a cynical
milieu, the way lay open for some men to
dismiss any refusal as simple apparent
refusal, and to see force as a legitimate
weapon in, and indeed inseparable from,
sexual conquest.(Hamilton, 23 3)
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The extent to which women outside the specific
Republican Wife/Mother role were forced into a sexually
unscrupulous vocabulary seems to become particularly crucial
at this moment:
the Bedlow-Sawyer case was thus transformed
into a dispute between a citizen and an
outsider— potent rhetoric in a society where
the misogyny informing all classes lay as
well at the heart of the republican political
theory on which that society had been
founded. (Hamilton, 246)
Through the shifting and evolving post-revolutionary system
of language, a violent crime becomes a battle over
citizenship. Abigail Adams, in an oft-quoted letter, points
out the misogyny at the heart of republican political theory
("Remember, all men would be tyrants if they could."). That
lurking misogyny rapidly informed post-revolutionary women's
roles, as the Republican Mother became a confining symbol of
patriotism and morality. Enlightenment philosophers were
read and reread, interpreted and reinterpreted, as the first
legislators carefully located women outside the boundaries
of the new nation.
Changing language and vocabulary are not incidental to
a discussion of a rape opinion, for, as Laurel Thatcher
Ulrich notes, "eighteenth-century literature became obsessed
with rape and seduction at the very time legal standards for
prosecuting such crimes were changing."

Also, as Joan

Hoff Wilson points out, "one of the greatest societal
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setbacks for women was a direct result of legal
modernization induced by new private and public laws which
appeared in the United States in the first three decades of
the nineteenth century".(10)
It is important to consider how the particularities of
a rural community inflect rape trials as well. In A
Midvrife 's Tale

Ulrich describes a rape case roughly

contemporary to the Bedlow-Sawyer case.

Rebecca Foster, the

wife of the minister Isaac Foster, accused several men of
raping her, as her neighbor, the midwife Martha Ballard,
recorded in her diary in October 1789: "Mrs Foster has sworn
a Rape on a number of men among whom is Judge North.
Shocking indeed" (Ulrich, 102). The similarities between the
rape(s) alleged by Mrs Foster and those alleged by Philena
Morehouse in People v. Abbot include the nature of life in
rural communities, the regard in which ministers may be held
in their communities, and the resonances of class
difference. Ulrich notes of Rebecca Foster that "except for
a few cryptic documents in the records of the Supreme
Judicial Court and a tantalizing set of entries in Martha's
diary, her story is lost" (104).

Ulrich goes on to say that

Martha Ballard and Rebecca Foster's "reticence is hardly
surprising, given the rarity of the accusation and the
severity of the penalty"( 1 1 8 ) . This statement is largely
true of Philena Morehouse's story as well, but in her case,
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as I will show, the young woman has been completely erased
by the force of Judge Cowen's opinion,

(As Foster's story

has not been completely lost, appearing as it does in
Ulrich's book, so too it is possible to reconstruct a
framework for Philena Morehouse's story: that being the work
of this essay.) While Rebecca Foster was the wife of the
local minister, her husband's place in the community was
tenuous enough once his contract had been cancelled^®. In
the Abbot case, it is the accused rapist who is the
minister, possibly lending his defense some weight and
dignity. Rebecca Foster, like Philena Morehouse, found her
character under assault, both overtly and implicitly, as
Martha Ballard writes, "I also testifed that said North said
to me Last weak [sic] that he really believed Mrs[.] Foster
was treated as she complains but he never had the least
reason to suspect her virtue or modesty" (Ulrich, 116).
Ballard also notes that "on trial Mrs Foster apeard very
Calm sedate & unmovd notwithstanding the strong atempts
there were made to throw aspersions on her Carrectir"
(Ulrich, 117).

Unfortunately Martha Ballard was nowhere

near the Court of Oyer and Terminer the day Philena
Morehouse testified.
II Kenneth A. Lockridge, "Patriarchal Rage: The Commonplace Books of
William Byrd II and Thomas Jefferson and the Gendering of Power in the
Eighteenth Century," quoted from the unpublished version, 1992, page 2.
Now published as On the Sources of Patriarchal Rage: The Commonplace
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Books of William Byrd and Thomas Jefferson and the Gendering of Power in
the Eighteenth Century, New York; New York University Press, 1992,
Susan Moller Okin, "Women and the Making of the Sentimental Family,"
Philosophy and Public p. 72. Her note cites Some Reflections Upon
Marriage, 1730 edition, pp. 106-107, NY; Source Books, 1970.
Women and the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary
America, Linda Kerber, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1980; p. 279. Subsequent references will be cited parenthetically in the
text.
Christine Stansell, City of Women: Sex and Class in New York 17891860, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987, p.23.
^^Hamilton, Marybeth, " ‘The Life of a Citizen in the Hands of a W o m a n ’:
Sexual Assault in New York City, 1790-1820," in New York and the Rise of
American Capitalism: Economic Development and the Social and Political
History of an American State, 1780-1870, William Pencak and C. E.
Wright, eds . , New York: The New-York Historical Society, 1989.
Subsequent citations will appear parenthetically in the text.
A Midwife's Tale: The Life of Martha Ballard, Based on her diary,
1785-1812, Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, New York: Vintage Books, a division
of Random House, Inc., 1991: page 386.
"Since rape was a capital crime, justices and grand juries frequently
reduced the charge in order to get a conviction. Only ten men were tried
for rape in Massachusetts in the entire eighteenth century, none after
1780. Between 1780 and 1797 there were sixteen indictments and ten
convictions for attempted rape, still a small number considering that
the population of the state approached 400,000" (Ulrich, 118).
While
this may have been the case in Massachusetts, rape was not a capital
crime in New York in 1837, and these justifications would not apply. It
was clearly a serious accusation, taken seriously, but by then, as will
become obvious, there were other reasons for women's reticence.
18 Foster's contract was cancelled in October 1788; he was formally
dismissed in December 1788. See Ulrich, p. 113.
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Based

on Philena Morehouse'

sworn testimony, the

following story emerges:
On a rainy Saturday evening in April, 1835, Philena
Morehouse, a thirteen-year-old indentured servant, was in
charge of the Abbot children's bedtime. Mrs. Abbot had taken
her youngest boy and gone to visit her mother earlier in the
day, expecting to return that evening. But it rained, and
since she had "poor

s h o e s " ,

20 Mrs. Abbot was unable to

return home. As darkness fell, the two older boys, aged nine
and seven, were in their trundle bed, which stood in its
usual position next to their father and mother's bed, in the
corner of the small room where the family also did its
cooking. The boys' four-year-old sister was in Philena's
bed, across the room.

Around seven or eight o'clock, with

the children already sound asleep, Philena Morehouse and the
children's father, Orson Abbot, went to their beds by the
light of the fire.
The children were still asleep about a half an hour
later when their father asked Philena^l to come to his bed.
When she did not respond, Orson Abbot, clad only in his
shirt, crossed the room, moved his sleeping daughter to the
"back side" of the bed, and pulled up Philena's shift. She
tried to keep her legs together, but he pulled them apart
and climbed on top of her. What followed was the first of a
20
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series of rapes and assaults that continued over the next
two years.
"When he got in the bed," Philena later testified, "I
told him I did not want to do so." Her refusal had little
effect, as Abbot "said,

'yes,— it won't do you no hurt.• I

did not hollow [sic] because I was afraid he would whip
m e .

"22 Although Philena was new to the Abbot household she

had already formed certain impressions of the inhabitants,
particularly Orson Abbot. When Abbot asked her to come to
his bed Philena was not surprised, having thought from
observing him on the drive home from her previous residence,
and seeing him about in the community, that his face was
"kinder mean," and that "he was just such a man" to make
sexual demands on her.
Philena Morehouse was not a sheltered innocent. She had
been bound to two families prior to her indenture to the
Abbots, and had resided in the local poorhouse as well (a
place to which she had no desire to return). She was
experienced enough in the ways of her world to make a
judgment about Orson Abbot, and possessed survival skills
that prevented her from crying out when Abbot forced himself
on her.
The rain continued for the next three or four days, and
Mrs. Abbot remained at her mother's. Abbot "did the same
thing [to Philena] every night while [Mrs. Abbot] was away."
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Eventually Mrs. Abbot returned, but her presence in the home
was not enough to protect Philena, as Abbot waylaid the girl
on a nearby farm in Lyons. Philena resisted, and tried to
get away, but Abbot took hold of her and pushed her down.
"When he took hold of me," Philena later testified,

"I

tried to get away from him and told him I did not want to.
He said I must— that it would be no hurt to me."
Abbot continued to rely on the notion that bound
girls were by their very status sexually available (he
later told Philena that "all bound girls did just so"),
and that they are thus impervious to physical or social
harm. Philena did not give in without a struggle, and
"continued to resist and try to get away." She was no
match for Abbot, however. He pushed her down, and held
her while he took down his pantaloons, and, as Philena
later recalled, "he had connexion with me and entered
my person this time— I resisted only a part of the
time— along at first & towards the last. It was against
my will."
Abbot was assured and confident of his rights, as at
first he did not even bother to warn Philena to keep quiet:
"nothing was said about my not saying anything about it, or
anything else." There was no need for Philena to keep quiet.
Abbot probably reasoned, for her tale could surely do him no
harm. After all, he was a married man and a preacher, and
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she an indentured servant. Philena noted during the trial
that it was not until a month or so after the first alleged
rape in the field that Abbot mentioned the necessity of
keeping silent about his actions:

"After we got up he said

I must never tell any body of it, and that if I would not,
he would make me some nice presents. I said I guessed I
would not." It is interesting to speculate about what it was
that caused Abbot, all of a sudden, to try to ensure
Philena's silence, and about Philena's reasons, at that
time, for agreeing to do so, but there is no way to know for
sure.

Perhaps his wife had become suspicious. Mrs. Abbot

would later be instrumental in Philena's departure from the
Abbot home, under circumstances that suggest she was aware
of a (seemingly) sexual relationship between her husband and
the servant. The "nice presents" Abbot promises Philena may
well have been items that would otherwise have belonged to
his wife, but the specifics ("sugar candy & raisins," for
example) are items that Philena could have had no good
reason for possessing. For a bound girl, any belongings were
a luxury; luxury belongings themselves were out of the
question.
At this point, too, twentieth century attitudes collide
emphatically with nineteenth century expectations. While it
may be abundantly clear to a modern reader that Philena's
agreement to keep silent at this point is a result of her
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economic position and her utter powerlessness in the social
structure she inhabits, a nineteenth-century judge might
well have heard this testimony and found all his prejudices
about young working class women confirmed.
Abbot repeatedly waylaid Philena, in the same field and
in the woods surrounding Lyons. He "coaxed me & promised me
sugar candy & raisins," she reported, "and told me it would
do me no hurt," a line of reasoning that is difficult for a
modern reader to follow at first.

Later on in Philena‘s

testimony, however, her account of Abbot's words renders his
meaning more explicitly: "he said it would never be any hurt
to me— that all other bound girls did just so." The "hurt"
Orson Abbot means is thus revealed to be damage to Philena
Morehouse's reputation, rather than any physical consequence
of the rape.
This prolonged sexual assault continued for the
duration of Philena's stay in the Abbot home. And she
was, apparently, offered an opportunity to leave,
although it was probably not a meaningful choice if the
alternative to the Abbot home was the poorhouse. Lyman
Dunning, "one of the Superintendents of the poor of
Wayne County," heard complaints against the Abbots in
the course of his daily work, as he later testified:
After Philena was bound to Abbot complaints
of her ill treatment that she was set to
digging potatoes in the spring & not well
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clothed, came to my ears, and I called at
Abbot's to inquire into the truth of t h e m . 23
Mrs. Abbot denied the validity of the complaints,
apparently saying "they were not true, and that if
there was anything else, she told the girl to answer
for herself." Dunning then apparently informed Philena
that she could leave the Abbots' home if she so chose,
but that she would have to go back to the poorhouse
while legal action was taken to "prosecute the
indentures"24. Philena responded (not entirely
surprisingly) that she would rather live with the
Abbots than return to the poorhouse. That hardly seems
a ringing endorsement, but counsel for the defense
clearly intended the anecdote to imply consent to
sexual intercourse,
Philena did eventually leave the Abbots, although
she was not forced to return immediately to the poor
house. Several versions of her departure from the
Abbots' appear in the record of testimony. The disputed
points seem to be myriad; whether the sometime hired
man John Lyon was hired well in advance to take Philena
elsewhere, or on the spur of the moment, after Philena
was thought to be stealing Mrs. Abbot's belongings;
whether Philena asked Lyon if she might accompany him
on a sleigh ride, having no intention of seeking
shelter elsewhere; whether the Shakers refused to take
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Philena in, or whether she changed her mind about where
she wanted to go. What seems clear from the record is
that Mrs. Abbot finally decided, on a Sunday in
February, 1837, that Philena Morehouse should not
continue to live under her roof. Philena's testimony
outlines her perception of the manner in which she left
the Abbot household:
I left Abbots on Sunday. I was sent away from
there by Mrs. Abbot. Mr. Abbot did not say I
must go away. Mr. John Lyon took me away. Mrs
Abbot employed Lyon to take me away. Mr.
Abbot was gone to meeting when Mrs. Abbot
employed Lyon to take me away. It was
arranged between Mrs. Abbot and Lyon that I
should be taken to the Shakers.
The plot thickens. Mrs. Abbot was obviously no fool. Whether
she arranged for Philena’s departure to protect the girl, or
her marriage, or out of revenge against a young woman who
was distracting her husband from his marriage vows, it is
clear that she thought she had good reason to wish Philena
gone.
Lyons' version presents Philena's departure somewhat
differently. According to his testimony, John Lyon arrived
at the Abbot home on his way to the nearby Shaker community.
He offered to take Philena with him for a sleigh ride if
Mrs. Abbot would make sure she was dressed warmly. He and
Mrs. Abbot had had some previous conversation about getting
Philena out of the household, ostensibly because Mrs. Abbot
considered Philena to be dishonest. Philena, preparing to
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leave, threw a little bundle tied up in a handkerchief into
John Lyon's cutter and went upstairs to put on her warm
clothes. Mrs. Abbot retrieved the bundle and opened it onto
the bed, displaying "two pair of silk gloves, a couple of
finger rings, a piece of Calico half a yard or a yard, a
piece of silk braid, and some thread, some garden seeds."
According to Lyon, Mrs. Abbot had previously noticed that
these items were missing, but whether she suspected Philena
of stealing them or her husband of giving trinkets to the
bound girl is unclear. Philena would not confess to stealing
the things, even after Lyon threatened her with jail. And
the catalogue of items, as reported by John Lyon, is
particularly damning; what reason could there be for Philena
Morehouse, indentured servant, to possess silk gloves? The
fact remains that, to make sure of the bound girl's
departure, Mrs. Abbot completed the transaction in her
husband's absence.
After she left the Abbott household, Philena stayed
with the William Pullen family, and Mrs. Pullen was the
first person she told about Orson Abbot raping her. Mrs.
Pullen may have encouraged Philena to take Abbot to court,
for in April 1837, Philena Morehouse brought charges against
Orson Abbot before James Edwards, a local judge or
magistrate.

Edwards sent Philena's case to Theron Strong,

the district attorney for Wayne County.
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On April 24, 1837, Orson Abbot was indicted at a Grand
Jury hearing before the local Court of Oyer and Terminer (a
court which had jurisdiction in criminal proceedings) with
Daniel Moseley, a local circuit judge, presiding.

Abbot's

indictment is signed in the name of Theron R. Strong,
District Attorney.
Theron Rudd Strong (1802-1873) was the District
Attorney for Wayne County, New York, and acted on Philena
Morehouse's behalf. He was a member of a family with a long
history of distinguished legal work. He was born in
Salisbury, Connecticut on November 7, 1802, and began his
law practice in Palmyra, New York, in 1826. Strong became
District Attorney in 1831, and went on to be elected Justice
of the Supreme Court of New York in 1851, after serving in
Congress and as a member of the State Assembly. His ancestor
Elder John Strong, or John the Puritan, was one of the first
settlers of Northampton, Massachusetts, and the Long Island
branch of the Strong family also produced a number of
notable historical figures. Theron Strong's cousin Justice
Selah Brewster Strong (1787-1872), in fact, wrote the
opinion for the court in People v. Jackson (1857)25^ a case
I will discuss at some length later.
The indictment against Abbot was filed three days after
the hearing. Moseley was Circuit Judge of the Seventh
Circuit of the State of New^^ork, and serving with him at
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the hearing were four judges of the County Courts of common
pleas and General Sessions; William Sisson, Theodore
Partridge, Daniel Poppins, and Marvin Rich. These four men,
at least, would have been local residents and familiar with
the community. The charge was presented to them (the Grand
Jury) as follows:
that Orson Abbot late of the town of Sodus
in the County of Wayne. . . .on the first
day of April in the year of our lord one
thousand eight hundred and thirty five
with force and arms. . . . in and upon one
Philena Morehouse in the peace of God and
of the said People [of New York] then and
there being, forcibly, violently and
feloniously did make an assault, and her
the said Philena Morehouse, then and there
forcibly, violently and against her will
feloniously did ravish and carnally know
against the peace of the people of the
State of New York and their dignity.26
And the jurors also presented the charge that "the said
Orson Abbot" had committed the sameoffense on numerous
occasions

inthe next two years27.

orson Abbot was further

alleged to have "beat[en], wound[ed], and ill treat[ed] with
intent" Philena Morehouse on October 1, 1835 and October 1,
1836, "to the great damage of the said Philena and against
the Peace of the People of the State of New York and their
dignity".

It is striking that the charge is presented as

not only an attempt to right alleged wrongs on behalf of an
individual, but also on behalf of "the People of the State
of New York and their dignity*' (italics mine) . The
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allegation of an assault against an intangible ideal is not
merely rhetorical in nature, and is quite different from
rape cases which are presented as an assault against a man's
property.

In the Bedlow-Sawyer case, as well, the

prosecuting attorney "stressed the violation not of a
woman's will, but of her honor; rape thus was hateful as a
perversion of each man's duty to protect chaste and helpless
females" (Hamilton, 229). The "chaste and helpless female"
was, however, not likely to be present in the courtroom when
the prosecutrix was an indentured servant. As we have seen,
class position inflected the reputations of all bound girls,
though to what extent this was a definition utilized by
unscrupulous employers (as a method of persuasion) is
unclear. The inclusion of the offense against "the People of
the State of New York and their dignity," then, serves to
counterbalance the negative effect of the prosecutrix's
class status.
The record continues with an exact copy of the
indictment, as it must have been read in court that day, and
concludes:
And afterwards. . . .on the twenty seventh
day of April in the year one thousand eight
hundred and thirty seven at the Court of Oyer
and Terminer and Jail delivery aforesaid,
held at the Court house in the town of Lyons
in the County aforesaid before the Circuit
Judge and the other judges aforesaid comes
the said Orson Abbot in his own proper
person, and having heard the said indictment
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read, the said Orson Abbot says that he is
not guilty of the premises in the said
indictment alleged against him as in and by
the said indictment is above set forth, and
thereupon he puts himself upon the country
and Theron R. Strong Esquire District
Attorney who presents for the people in this
behalf doth do likewise.
So, in other words, Orson Abbot pleaded not guilty, and
"afterwards the said Indictment for certain reasons was sent
by the said Court of Oyer and Terminer and Jail Delivery to,
and received by the Court of General Sessions of the peace
held at the court house" in Lyons, New York, "to be tried
according to law, and the directions of the statute
provided.
This, in fact, is the action on which the Supreme Court
of Judicature decision turns. Before 1847, the question of
jurisdiction on the New York State court system seems to
have been quite difficult to follow. District Attorney
Theron Strong could have prosecuted Orson Abbot for rape
before the court of Oyer and Terminer, or he could have
prosecuted Abbot on the assault and battery charges before
the Court of General Sessions. The rules of jurisdiction did
not allow Strong to prosecute Abbot for rape before the
Court of General Sessions, and this error proved enough to
reverse Abbot's conviction. Whatever the "certain reasons"
were that prompted the district attorney to send the case to
the Court of General Sessions, they weren't good enough. The
trial began, in the wrong court, on May 25, 1837.
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The details of the alleged assaults appear in the
record of Philena Morehouse's testimony, as it was set down
by the clerk of the Courts of Common Pleas and General
Sessions, Cullen Foster. The pattern of the assaults affords
modern readers a fairly detailed picture of Philena's daily
existence, as Abbot seems to have laid in wait for her on
every path and behind every bush in the Lyons/Sodus area, as
well as lurking in the haymow. Marybeth Hamilton notes that
"women were attacked.

. . .not on extraordinary excursions

into the city's unfamiliar nether reaches, but in the most
mundane of settings, in the same locations in which they
lived and worked, and as they went about their everyday
chores and pleasures."(231) As we have seen, Philena
Morehouse was first attacked in a place that was at once
familiar and unfamiliar— her own bed, "about a week after
she went to live with [Abbot]." Even that is problematic,
however, for it was not her own bed, but rather the bed set
aside for her use by the Abbot family, and belonging, as did
everything in the home, to Orson

A b b o t . 29

Philena Morehouse’s testimony, as recorded by the
clerk, exhibits little surprise or outrage at the events
that had allegedly occurred. As presented in the bill of
exceptions,

(a record, admittedly, allowing for little

emotional expression) she was able to provide a matter-offact account of events. The clerk of courts did, however.
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manage to record some of the flavor of the testimony of
other witnesses; when the Van Maters, Philena's former
employers, testify, their dislike of Philena is apparent in
every word as they faithfully report every nasty bit of
gossip about their former servant, Philena seems, from the
records, to have had no hesitation about admitting her lack
of resistance or outcry during Abbot's attacks. This
admission may have resonated quite differently when she
testified in the local court than it read, as part of the
bill of exceptions, in the Supreme Court of Judicature
hearing. This may have been an occasion when Abbot's
reputation within the community worked against him in a
court made up of members of that community. The jury's
knowledge of Orson Abbot the person may have outweighed
problematic testimony on Philena's part.
There seems to have been little conversation between
Philena and Abbot until the third night, when "the defendant
said he wanted I should do every thing he wanted me to do,
and always obey him. This was after he got out of my bed. He
said nothing further."
Reading further into the bill of exceptions, the fact
that a jury convicted Abbot becomes more surprising, given
the prevailing cultural values. Again, it may be that
Abbot's reputation at the local level weighed heavily
enough with the jury to overshadow some of the most
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surprising aspects of

Philena's testimony. The record of

her testimony regarding the first rape continues (italics
mine):
It hurt when he put some thing into me. I was
not bloody. There was no blood on my clothes
or on the sheets. I did not scream nor cry. I
am sure he entered my body. I was not lame
the next day.
It seems extraordinary that this revelation was not
enough to prove that Philena had been sexually active and
was therefore unrapeable. There are no indications that
anyone in the courtroom made an effort to continue this line
of investigation until the close of testimony. Her testimony
continues with details of the incidents outside the home.
There also seems to have been a series of questions
related to Philena's disclosure of the rape(s). The record
of her testimony suggests that she maintained a positive
front within the community, but is not clear as to her
reasons for choosing Mrs. Pullen as her confidante. Philena
also has her own reasons for not telling people about the
rapes, as she states again and again:
I told John Lyon that Mr. Abbott always used
me well because I did not want to tell him. I
have never said I liked to live at Abbotts. I
don't recollect telling Mercy Foster so. I
told old Mrs. Hughson [Mrs. Abbott's mother]
I liked to live at Abbots, but I did not like
to live there.
Since John Lyon seems to have been Mrs. Abbot's ally in the
accusations of theft, it would have been quite odd had
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Philena chosen him as her confidante. While Philena also
seems to have been caught fibbing to Mrs. Abbot's mother,
neither of these dissimulations appeared to the court as
serious offenses against truth and veracity. At the local
level, the jury seems to have been remarkably alert to the
nuances of Philena's situation, overlooking ostensible gray
areas in her testimony and focusing on Abbot's actions
rather than Philena's. The issue of who Philena told about
the rape(s) and when she told them is a problematic one as
far as the attorneys were concerned, however, as the record
suggests that related questions were put on a number of
occasions during the trial. Philena admits that
two or three of my brothers and my father
came [to Abbotts] while I lived there— one of
my brothers was there about a month after the
first time he had connexion with me. I did
not tell them about it, nor did I tell any
body else till after I left there. Lyman
Dunning one of the Superintendents of the
poor who bound me to Abbott called there
while I was there and asked me, if I was
dissatisfied. I told him I was not, I dare
not tell him I was dissatisfied. Mrs. Abbott
was by while he asked me.
Certainly it seems unlikely that Philena would have felt
comfortable confiding in an authority figure while her
employer (and the wife of the alleged rapist) was standing
right there. It is not as clear why she felt unable to
confide in her brothers or her father, but as the family
seems to have been separated for some time, the relationship
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may not have been in any way traditionally familial.

(From

the records available, there seems to have been no time when
all members of the family lived together in their own home.)
Later questions suggest that Abbott's lawyer tried to
determine whether Philena had been put up to bringing the
charge by any of her relatives. Philena testifies that she
was brought to court by her uncle, Mr. Cephas Fields, but
assured the court that he had not told her what to testify,
nor had anyone else.
Philena concludes this section of her testimony by
noting that Orson Abbot "told me he thought I would be sorry
if I went to the Shakers." This could be read as a veiled
threat, or, possibly, as a sign that Abbot knew Philena well
enough to know where she would certainly not fit in. It
certainly suggests that Philena had discussed the
possibility of leaving with Orson Abbot. There seems to have
been no follow-up to the statement.
And then, amid all the recorded answers, Philena
apparently responds to a question: "I knew William Cooper^0
while I lived at Van Mater's. He lived at Van Maters & was
hired man there a month while I lived there." This response
seems oddly out of place, and, equally oddly, unaccompanied
by further investigation. A series of questions, not
recorded by the clerk of courts, seem to have been put with
the express design of casting doubt on Philena Morehouse as
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a credible witness, and, more broadly, establishing whether
she is in fact entitled to the protection of the court in
this matter. There seems to have been a parade of witnesses
eager to cast doubt on Philena's reputation, including
several of her former employers. Strong's objection to a
direct question (ostensibly referring to Cooper) later
provides Abbot's lawyer basis for the appeal.
The trial concluded with a parade of witnesses,
including Philena's former employers and neighbors, all
offering character testimony, both good and bad. David Van
Mater testified that while Philena lived with him and his
family, "she was not a girl of truth.

. . . The general

speech of people, while she was at my house.

. . .was, that

she was an impudent girl about chastity.
One of the last witnesses called was James Edwards, the
magistrate before whom Philena first brought rape charges
against Abbot. Here at last is a follow-up to Philena's
testimony about the absence of blood on the sheets. Abbot's
attorney bluntly asks James Edwards "Did Philena testify
before you on her Examination that she had had connexion
with any other persons before she went to live at Abbotts?"
Theron Strong immediately objected, and the court did not
allow the question. The defense counsel "excepted to the
decision excluding the said question," thereby preserving
the point for appeal.
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The jury proceeded to find Orson Abbot guilty of
assault and battery.

Following the seals of Judges Sisson,

Partridge, Poppins and Rich, there is a note reading, "I
hereby certify that there is so much doubt as to render it
expedient to take the Judgment of the Supreme Court on the
within Bill of Exceptions," signed by William Sisson.
In the account of the trial before the Supreme Court of
Judicature, the court reporter,
few more

John L. Wendell, fillsin a

of the blanks from the local trial and providesan

additional account of Philena Morehouse's cross-examination:
On the trial at the sessions the prosecutrix,
on whom the rape was charged to have been
committed, and who testified as a witness in
support of the prosecution, on her crossexamination was asked whether she had ever
had carnal connection with any person other
than the defendant previous to her connection
with him. The district attorney objected to
the question, and the court decided that it
should not be put, and overruled the same.
The counsel for the defendant asked the
magistrate before whom the complaint was made
whether the prosecutrix testified before him,
on her examination, that she had connection
with any person before she had connection
with the defendant: this question was also
objected to and overruled (People v. Abbot,
192) .
This line of questioning should be all too familiar to
anyone acquainted with the modern issues of admissibility of
evidence in rape trials. The counsel for the defense
employed familiar strategy, that of balancing the alleged
rapist's 'fine' reputation in the community against the word
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of a woman of 'doubtful' reputation, as we learn from
Wendell's introductory notes to the case as it was presented
on appeal:
The defendant was a married man and a preacher of
the gospel; his counsel inquired of a female
witness (Mercy Foster) who had resided in his
house a portion of the time during which the
prosecutrix alleged that the defendant had
intercourse with her, whether she had ever
observed any immodest intercourse or any improper
familiarity between the defendant and the
prosecutrix. This question was also overruled
(People V. Abbot, 192).
Here, too, Orson Abbot's attorney attempted to cast
doubt on Philena Morehouse's character; more
specifically, the question put to Mercy Foster (and
subsequently overruled by Daniel Moseley) is designed
to produce the impression that whatever it was that
happened to Philena Morehouse, she brought it on
herself by "improper familiarity":
The defendant having adduced some evidence
slightly impeaching the character of the
prosecutrix for truth and veracity, offered
to prove that her character in that respect
was bad six or seven years previous to the
trial: to the introduction of which testimony
the district attorney objected, and the same
was excluded by the court. The defendant
excepted to these several decisions, and the
question submitted to this court arose upon
these exceptions (People v. Abbot, 192).
The case, then, went on appeal to the Supreme
Court of Judicature in 1837. Now it would be Esek
Cowen's turn.
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25 3 Parker C. R.
391 (Sup. Ct. 1857)
26 agg Supreme Court of Judicature Writs of Error (Utica) (Series J0031,
New York State Archives).
2^ June 1, 1835;
August 1, 1835; October 1, 1835;
December 1, 1835;
February 1, 1836;
April 1, 1836; June 1, 1836;
August 1, 1836;
October 1, 1836; December 1, 1836; and on February 1, 1837, see Supreme
Court of Judicature Writs of Error (Utica) (Series J0031, New York State
Archives).
28 agg Supreme Court of Judicature Writs of Error (Utica) (Series J0031,
New York State Archives).
29 I am grateful to Nancy Cook for this insight.
20 Philena Morehouse seems to have been suspected of having a sexual
relationship with William Cooper. Details of the accusation are scarce,
mostly contained in innuendo and in the way certain c[uestions are
framed.
31 ggg Supreme Court of Judicature Writs of Error (Utica) (Series J0031,
New York State Archives).
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Judge Esek Cowen (1787-1844)32

a well-known and

well-respected member of the legal profession in New York.
The inventory of his law library shows a collection
containing approximately 2800 volumes, which made it the
most extensive and valuable law library in the country at
the time was advertised for

s a l e .

33 His form

b o o k

34^ begun

in 1806 when Cowen was nineteen, is an excellent example of
the way a good nineteenth-century lawyer built up his
knowledge of forms and statutes and effective statements of
legal points. It even contains several entries on proper
methods of figuring costs to be awarded. Cowen is described
as an "eminent

ju ri st "3 5

and "his opinions, it was said,

were 'not excelled by those of any judge in England or
America,* in their 'depth and breadth of research and their
strength of reasoning'" (Chester, 1103). The death of "the
excellent and learned Esek Cowen" in 1844 caused "the
judiciary, the bar, and the State" to suffer "an almost
irreparable

l o s s .

"36 Proctor continues his paean to Cowen:

His vast legal knowledge, his intimate
acquaintance with precedent, his wonderfully
retentive memory, his unceasing industry, his
love of research, gave him the reputation of
being one of the most erudite judges in the
nation.... It caused him to trace every
principle of law to its fountain head— to
describe every variation and restriction in
its course, modifying or neutralizing its
force and meaning...In many respects, he was
to the American bar what Mansfield was to the
English.(Proctor, 385-6)
42
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Cowen worked with his friend, Nicholas Hill, one
of the most famous ’’special

p l e a d e r s ”

^7 of the day, to

produce an important reference text, Cowen & Hill’s
Notes to Phillips on Evidence.

(Cowen’s son Sidney

seems to have continued both his father's friendship
with Hill and the working relationship, and worked on
later editions of the Notes.)

Esek Cowen's opinions

were famous, as L. B. Proctor notes: "His legal
opinions are the trophies— the imperishable monuments
of his great judicial powers; they have been criticised
for their length, their prolixity, and their
discursiveness, but those faults, if indeed they can be
considered faults, are the result of his great
profundity” (385-6). Were it not for Cowen's
discursiveness. People v. Abbot would be simply another
entry in Wendell's Reports^®.
Judge Cowen's opinion for the court in People v. Abbot
is rich with cultural history. The breadth of its author's
education is readily apparent in a wealth of literary and
religious allusion; contemporary attitudes toward women,
especially as regarding their place in society, are equally
apparent. Even accounting for connotations which may have
evolved considerably over 150 years, a late twentiethcentury reader will be struck by the force of the language
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Judge Cowen employs against this plaintiff in particular,
and women seeking the protection of the court in g e n e r a l . 39
The familiar line of questioning utilized by Abbot's
lawyers as they attempted to use evidence of bad character
to discredit Philena Morehouse's story caught Judge Cowen's
attention.

While his colleague in the court of Oyer and

Terminer had overruled several of the questions aimed at
Philena Morehouse's reputation, and while these questions
ultimately had no bearing on his decision, Esek Cowen felt
compelled to discuss their relevance. Given his views on the
subject, it is clear that Judge Cowen would have allowed the
questions :
The question to the prosecutrix herself,
whether she had not had previous criminal
connection with other men, was, I think,
proper, assuming, as we do at present, that
the defendant could be considered on trial
either on the charge of rape, or for an
assault and battery with intent to commit
that crime. (People v. Abbot, 192-3)
Note that the judge has transformed the original
question, "had she had connection with any person before she
had connection with the defendant," to "whether she had not
had criminal

connection with other men" (italics mine).

While the two may have been nearly synonymous in Wayne
County, New York, in 1837, the resonance of the phrase
"criminal connection" is quite different from an unadorned
"connection", seeming far more calculated and deliberate, a
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real threat to the fabric of society. "Criminal connection"
also has quite a different set of connotations than does the
phrase "carnal connection," again regardless of whether the
two may have been nearly identical in meaning to a
nineteenth-century audience.
As language has changed dramatically over the last
hundred years, so too was it in flux during the post
revolutionary era, as Cynthia Jordan reads
the after-effects of the American Revolution
on language and on attitudes toward language;
to suggest, in particular, the complex links
between language and authority, and language
and power, that came to exist in the minds of
the men who first shaped this country and
that led them so often to 'unfix' the
traditional meanings of the words they used
in response to their 'new circumstances'
What Jordan names 'unfixing' is the startled reaction of the
men who based their Revolution on Enlightenment
philosophies, upon discovering that those very philosophies
empowered several interested groups whom the leaders of the
Revolution had not intended to empower. As one can see from
documents such as the Essex

Result^l,

a good deal of energy

was hastily devoted to excluding women, and men without
property, and to layering gendered and class-based language
and entitlements over the Revolutionary ideal. Cowen,
perhaps in response to the shifting meanings around him,
chooses strong, biblically-linked, unambiguous language to
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express his reading of the proper rape

v i c t i m ^

2^ but employs

the unstable language to his benefit as well. Cowen
continues:
In such a case the material issue is on the
willingness or reluctance of the prosecutrix-an act of the mind...The prosecutrix is
usually, as here, the sole witness to the
principal facts, and the accused is put to
rely for his defence on circumstantial
evidence. (People v. Abbot, 194)
To a late twentieth century reader, the weight of this
comment is to render implicit the contention that a
thirteen-year-old female servant could not possibly be
a trustworthy witness. Implicit as well is the fear
that any woman could bring an unfounded charge of rape,
and the man so charged would be powerless to defend
h i m s e l f . C o w e n also describes "the willingness or
reluctance of the prosecutrix" as "an act of the mind,"
although determining willingness or reluctance is based
on a physical act:
Any fact tending to the inference that there
was not the utmost reluctance and the utmost
resistance is always received. That there was
not an immediate disclosure, that there was
no outcry, though aid was at hand and that
known to the prosecutrix, that there are no
indications of violence to the person, are
put as among the circumstances of defence;
not as conclusive but as throwing distrust
upon the assumption that there was a real
absence of assent. (People v. Abbot, 194)
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Judge Cowen's slippery linguistic feat has rendered
equivalent "utmost resistance" with "a real absence of
a s s e n t . I n her testimony, Philena's response to the issue
of her failure to cry out was that she was afraid Abbot
would whip her. Cowen would have seen this response, as it
is contained in the bill of exceptions, the set of documents
sent by the Court of General Sessions to the Supreme Court
of Judicature. And aid, in the form of the three small Abbot
children asleep in the same room, seems at best a temporary
relief.

There may have been a family living in another part

of the Abbots' house; it is unclear whether they were home
at the time. That Philena Morehouse was without economic
assets and dependent for room and board on the alleged
rapist (that she was a bound girl with all that implies) and
that she was only thirteen years old at the time of the
first alleged assault has, apparently, no bearing upon the
case. Certainly, as Marybeth Hamilton (among others) has
shown, in an urban setting girls as young as six years old
were the target of forced sexual activity^S; a thirteenyear-old is at quite an advanced age, given those
conditions. Sir Matthew Hale, the distinguished British
jurist, set ten years as the age at which a female person
could consent to sexual intercourse. Indenture papers,
however, usually served to bind a young man or woman to an
adult household until at least the age of eighteen, implying
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attainment of majority at that age and not before, at least
for certain purposes. Judge Cowen again:
the connection must be absolutely against the
will; and are we to be told that previous
prostitution shall not make one among those
circumstances which raise a doubt of assent?
that the triers should be advised to make no
distinction between the virgin and a tenant
of the stew? between one who would prefer
death to pollution, and another who, incited
by lust and lucre, daily offers her person to
the other sex? {People v. Abbot, 194)
Sexual intercourse (or rape) becomes "prostitution";
"connection" becomes "criminal connection". The
transformation of the language itself seems designed to
place the worst possible light on any expression of female
sexuality outside marriage (again, it is awkward for modern
readers to realize that it was appropriate, in the eyes of
nineteenth-century jurists, to discuss female sexuality in
relation to rape). Judge Cowen seemingly anticipated this
interpretation :
Shall I be answered that an isolated instance
of criminal connection does not make a common
prostitute? I answer, yes; it only makes a
prostitute. . . .but no court can overrule
the law of human nature^®, which declares
that one who has already started on the road
of prostitution, would be less reluctant to
pursue her way, than another who yet remains
at her home of innocence, and looks upon such
a career with horror. (People v. Abbot,
196)
Cowen's condemnation has thus translated one hypothetical
instance of premarital or extramarital "connection" into the
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beginning of a career in prostitution. Philena Morehouse had
no "home of innocence"; she had been an indentured servant
in other people's homes from the age of ten or eleven (and
before that, apparently, had lived at the poorhouse with her
father and brothers). This absence of a traditional
upbringing (read innocence) was enough to brand Philena
Morehouse sexually available, and from there it was but a
short step to regarding her as a "common prostitute".
And why not? Sexually available women were a
temptation to respectably married men. Rape was no longer a
capital crime in New York State^®, so a charge of rape did
not mean, as it had in the early republic, that "the life of
a citizen [rested] in the hands of a woman" (Hamilton, 246).
It was instead a potential threat to the unity of the
republican family. Women who appeared, in nineteenth century
terms, to choose to be sexually active outside of marriage
had to be "inspired by lust and lucre".
As Philena Morehouse surely discovered during her time
in the various courts, her appearance and past conduct were
desperately important;
Why? Because in the practised vendor of bad
coin or bad bills we more readily infer a
guilty knowledge than in the novice. (People
V. Abbot, 194)
This is by no means a minor point. Issues of disclosure
continue to be very important, for as Cowen noted, knowledge
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of human nature might well suggest that a witness who has
previously perjured him or herself might well do so again; a
person who has stolen might well do so again. The question
of how much a jury is entitled to know is a question Cowen
emphasizes repeatedly;
And will you not more readily infer assent in
the practised Messalina, in loose attire,
than in the reserved and virtuous Lucretia?
Both knowledge and assent are affections of
the mind, and the mode of proving both, rests
on the same principle in the philosophy of
evidence. (People v. Abbot, 194)
The choice of Messalina as metaphor for the sexually
active woman is particularly telling. The ravenous,
consuming wife of Claudius, set in opposition to

Lucretia,

wife of Tarquin, is another symbolically loaded emblem of
the demon woman versus the epitome of chastity and purity,
and one which was certainly familiar to Cowen's
contemporaries. ^0 ^^y classically-educated nineteenthcentury man would have been familiar with Tacitus' Annales,
and would not have needed to spend any time unpacking this
allusion.(The rhetorical question cited above appears in
most citations of the case, as Cowen's language resonates in
contemporary discussions of the admissibility of character
evidence in rape trials.) Again, slippery language results
in a familiar equation: knowledge = assent. There seems to
have been no language for forced sexual intercourse within
marriage or when the woman in question was not a middle- or
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upper-class member of society of unsullied reputation AND a
virgin:
Why is this? Because there is not so much
probability that a common prostitute or the
prisoner's concubine would withhold her
assent, as one less depraved; and may I not
ask, does not the same probable distinction
arise between one who has already submitted
herself to the lewd embraces of another, and
the coy and modest female, severely chaste
and instinctively shuddering at the thought
of impurity? Shall I be answered that both
are equally under the protection of the
law?(People v. Abbot, 194)
Although Cowen goes on to admit that both are indeed
equally under the protection of the law, he does so
grudgingly and conditionally. The familiar virgin/whore
dichotomy is explicitly at work in Cowen's universe: "shall
the triers make no distinction between a virgin and a tenant
of the stew?" The fact of Philena Morehouse's status as a
"bound girl" further complicates the

dichotomy with issues

of class status, but these are twentieth century issues and
almost certainly would not have entered into Cowen's
conscious interpretation of the situation.
If a woman's family was not in good standing in the
community, as in the Foster case, her marital status seems
not to have been enough to validate her claim.

Mrs Foster's

allegations thus led inevitably to attacks on her virtue and
"Carrectir".

Rape opinions from Abbot (in 1837) to Carey

(in 1909) to the present^^ show that post-revolutionary
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America defined a standard of behavior and morality, which
holds today, to be applied whenever a woman sought the
protection of the court.
As I have said before. Abbot is a fascinating case
precisely because of the absolute irrelevance of the most
influential part of the opinion, the sections cited above
which have had considerable impact on issues of evidence in
rape law.52 After reading Judge Cowen's opinion I have been
able to consider questions about nineteenth-century men's
attitudes toward women's sexuality (in an arena where the
discussion, sparked as it was by charges of rape, should not
have had anything to do with sexuality), and issues of class
in sexual assault. In the final analysis, however, none of
these things mattered:
there is another reason why judgment against
the defendant must be withheld; or if
rendered, why he must be discharged from it.
The court below had no jurisdiction of this
indictment. . . .The imprisonment may be for
life, on conviction of a rape. . . .To
warrant a trial at the sessions, the district
attorney should have entered a nolle prosequi
53on the numberous counts for rape. The issue
tried here was general on all the counts, the
jury and witnesses were sworn, and the
verdict rendered on that issue. The whole was
coram non j u d i c e and void. Not a witness
could be indicted for perjury; nor could any
effectual judgment be rendered, or execution
issued.
Here is C o w e n 's decision, in one paragraph. There has been a
procedural error; regardless of anything else that occurred.
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the trial took place before the wrong court and must be
considered void. Having ruled, however, Cowen continues:
I know not to what extent the evidence was
intended to be placed before us. There is
vastly more in the bill of exceptions than
was necessary to raise the points of law
proposed by counsel. I will only say, that if
the district attorney should think he cannot
make more of this case than what we are able
to see, he had better not try this man again
upon the present indictment. I should very
much doubt on the evidence, whether he has
been guilty even of a simple assault and
battery. Upon that matter, however, we cannot
advise finally, for want of knowing what
there may be left out of the case. It is our
proper province merely to pronounce on the
questions of law (People v. Abbot, 200).
If it is the "proper province [of the Supreme Court of
Judicature] merely to pronounce on the questions of law,"
why does Cowen comment at all? He must have known that his
opinions were held in very high regard. If there were some
reason to lash out at the Wayne County district attorney,
surely there was a more appropriate forum. The vehemence of
these closing remarks reinforce my feeling that there is
much more at stake for Cowen than the fate of a teenage
bound girl and her employer (or saving the state of New York
the cost of bringing the case again in the proper, lowerlevel court).
One possible reading of this section of the opinion is
that Esek Cowen, whose form book shows the detailed and
methodical way he prepared to become a lawyer himself, did
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not suffer fools gladly, and considered a procedural error
the mark of a fool. Someone as committed to preparation as
Cowen may well have perceived Strong's error as a sign that
he was an incompetent lawyer. In any case, Cowen chose a
very public and lasting forum in which to deliver his
lecture.
His language suggests that Cowen also perceives a real
threat in 'unworthy' women seeking the protection of the
court; that for him the "Female Monster," to borrow Susan
Gubar's term, is a sexually active woman, motivated by
desire (or economic necessity) and under the control of no
man.Cowen concludes

the opinion with a set of directions

for the Wayne County district attorney,

and the implicit

comment that the whole issue would be better off dropped:
There must be a re-trial, if we may be
allowed to so speak in a case where there
has, as yet, been no trial at all; and if the
counts for rape be not abandoned, the cause
must be tried by the oyer and terminer.
(People V. Abbot, 200)
This must have been a crushing blow to Philena
Morehouse. Regardless of the truth of the matter, her
status in the community was such that, regardless of
Abbot's conviction at the local level, bringing an
ultimately inconclusive charge of rape against her
employer would probably ruin her reputation in the
community forever more. As someone who depended on her
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employability for survival, Philena Morehouse probably
suffered economic hardship (again) as a result of
Cowen's decision. I don't know yet what happened to her
or to the case after this.

Orson Abbot's conviction

was at least temporarily reversed; the district
attorney was shown to have made important procedural
errors, and in summarizing his position one of the most
learned and well-respected jurists of the era delivered
himself of the opinion that "I should very much doubt
on the evidence, whether [Abbot] has been guilty even
of a simple assault and battery". L. B. Proctor said of
Cowen's opinions that
the lawyer, the student, the scholar, those
who love the learning of the bar, those who
admire judicious and philosophic arguments,
and possess the industry to seek for them,
will find in the opinions of Judge Cowen,
legal Golcondas glowing with richest gems of
erudition. (Proctor, 385-6)
Judge Cowen's opinion in the Abbot case glows with the
intensity and weight of early nineteenth century American
literature, history, and culture. His perception of the
issues implicit and explicit in a rape case, and his
gendered reading of the

purview of the court itself provide

brief but telling glimpses of the structure upon which late
twentieth-century law and culture rest. Indeed, it is the
very "length, prolixity, and discursiveness" which annoyed
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some of his colleagues that render Cowen's opinions
invaluable to a modern-day reader.
Records differ on the date of Cowen's birth, some sources giving 1784
and others 1787.
The History of the Bench and Bar of New York states
that he "ranked among the foremost lawyers and judges of New York state.
Early obtaining marked recognition as a practitioner, he was appointed
in 1823 reporter to the Supreme Court, retaining the position until
1828. During the period of his service he produced seven volumes of
reports. In 1828 he was appointed judge of the 4th circuit in place of
Reuben H. Walworth, who was made chancellor. In 1836 he became associate
justice of the Supreme Court, filling the position with distinguished
ability until 1844. He was author of "Civil Jurisdiction of Justices of
the Peace," and, in connection with Nicholas Hill, of "Notes to
Phillips' Evidence," a standard book of reference on that branch of the
law" <McAdam, p. 288).
Catalogue of the Law Library of Judge Esek Cowen, in the Special
Collections Department of the Harvard Law School Library.
^^Also in the Special Collections Department of the Harvard Law School
Library.
Courts and Lawyers of New York, A History 1609-1925, by Alden Chester
(New York and Chicago; The American Historical Society, Inc., 1925)
volume III. Subsequent citations will appear parenthetically in the
text.
^^The Bench and Bar of New-York, by L. B. Proctor (New York: Diossy &
Company, 1870), 385.
L. B. Proctor, Lives of Eminent Lawyers and Statesmen of the State of
New York, with notes of cases tried by them, speeches, anecdotes, and
Incidents In their lives, New York: S. S. Peloubet & Company 1882, p.
626. There was, at the time, a group of lawyers who made their living
arguing cases for other lawyers in front of the state Supreme Court,
thus saving vast amounts of travel time and inconvenience— Hill was one
of the best of these.
^®Case reports from state court systems are collected in volumes of
reports. In New York State, the volumes bore the names of the court
reporters, hence Wendell's Reports, or Barbour’s Reports, for example.
39 Fruitful investigations of the history of rape law are by no means
unique to cases originating in the state of New York: see, for example,
Constance B. B a c k h o u s e , T h e Sayer Street Outrage': Gang Rape and Male
Law in 19th Century Toronto," and James A. Vaught and Margaret Henning,
"Admissibility of a Rape Victim's Prior Sexual Conduct in Texas: A
Contemporary Review and Analysis."
40 Cynthia S. Jordan, "'Old Words' in 'New Circumstances’: Language and
Leadership in Post-Revolutionary America," American Quarterly, vol. 40,
December 1988, no. 4: 503. Subsequent citations will appear
parenthetically in the text.
4lThe Essex Result, 1778, is the response of a convention of delegates
from towns including Salem, Danvers, Waltham, and Ipswich to the
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proposed Massachusetts Constitution. The document contains objections
from issues of property ("11. That in a free government, a law affecting
the person and property of it's [sic] members, is not valid, unless it
has the consent of a majority of the members, which majority should
include those, who hold a major part of property in the state." (81))to
gender ("Women what age soever they are of, are also considered as not
having a sufficient acquired discretion; not from a deficiencey in their
mental powers, but from the natural tenderness and delicacy of their
minds, their retired mode of life, and various domestic duties." (81)).
From Massachusetts, Colony to Commonwealth: Documents on the Formation
of Its Constitution, 1775-1780, edited by Robert J. Taylor, Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early
American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia, (1961).
Cowen was following an already well-established pattern here. As
Stephen P. Pistonio points out, "In 1285, the Statute of Westminster
proclaimed that any man guilty of raping a married woman or virgin
would be considered guilty of a felony and put to death"(italics mine):
the judgment about which women were entitled to protection from violent
crime was already in place. (Stephen P. Pistonio, "Susan Brownmiller and
the History of Rape," Women's Studies. Volume 14, no. 3, 1988, p. 271).
See, for example, Marybeth Hamilton, p. 246 or Jackson, p. 397.
Cowen'8 opinion, though dictum, has been extremely influential in
rape law. In People v. Carey, 223 N. Y. 519, 119 N.E. 83, for example,
the court opined that "Rape is not committed unless the woman oppose the
man to the utmost limit of her power. A feigned or passive or
perfunctory resistance is not enough. It must be genuine and active and
proportioned to the outrage." (519) While there is room for interpretive
possibility in the phrase "utmost limit of her power," the court makes
its position clear in the following sentences. Regardless of the
circumstances, in order to seek the protection of the court a woman must
be able to prove that she exerted active resistance against her
attacker. Carey
is an interesting case in that some members of the
court wished to
follow Cowen on another matter, as noted: "Some of the
members of the court desire to place their concurrence upon the
additional ground that error was committed in rejecting testimony
tending to prove that the complainant was unchaste. They think that the
exclusion of such testimony may work a denial of justice."
^^Hamilton, 235.
46 The catalogue of Cowen's law library includes Thomas Hobbes'
Leviathan, explaining, perhaps, this grim view of human nature.
47 cowen continues, puzzlingly, "I have long had occasion to know and to
consider much, the two cases cited as adverse to the reception of this
evidence; and I never yet could bring myself to doubt that circumstances
much more remote and of less influence are constantly received on the
best authority " (Abbot, 196). I am not sure how to begin to try to
figure out what
this means, but it does suggest that there is more
going
on for Cowen inthis case than meets the eye.
48 New York Revised Statutes.
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And economic motivation, in women, may have been more cause for
distrust than lust; in post-revolutionary society men were the only ones
who were supposed to be concerned with money and economic growth.
The Messalina image was a part of the language of female sexuality
well before Esek Cowen came on the scene. William Byrd (1674-1744), for
example, quotes long anecdotes related to issues of female sexuality in
his commonplace book, including the following:
Messalina, who obliged 25 men in 20 hours, and
Cleopatra, who in one night stood the attacque of 105
young Fellows woud have made sad Disciples to that
Philiosopher (Solon). The first of these illustrious
Ladys when she had passt t h r o ' the whole number askt
if there were no more, for tho she was tired she was
not satisfyd. (Lockridge, 11)
In Commonwealth vs. Edward J. Manning (328 N.E. 2d 496), a case heard
on appeal before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
December, 1974, the defendant had been convicted of
"rape, sodomy,
unnnatural and lascivious acts, and assault and battery." (496)
Manning's lawyers had attempted, during the original trial, to introduce
evidence showing the complainant's "poor reputation for chastity."
(496). The Appeals Court held that the trial judge should not have
excluded this evidence, and reversed the conviction; the Supreme
Judicial Court upheld this decision. Justice Braucher, however,
dissented,
I think the exceptions should be overruled on the
indictments for sodomy, unnatural and lascivious acts,
and assault and battery, for the reasons given by the
Appeals Court: 'The excluded testimony. . . .bore only
on the issue of consent, not on veracity. Wigmore,
Evidence, @ 924b . . . . The convictions on the other
indictments are therefore not affected by the error.'
In view of the extended discussion of the point by the
court, some elaboration of these reasons is
appropriate. The 'established law' on which the
court's opinion rests is part of a legal tradition,
established by men, that the complaining woman in a
rape case is fair game for character assassination in
open court. Its logical underpinnings are shaky in the
extreme. See, for example. People v. Abbott [sic] . .
. .:'And will you not more readily infer assent in the
practised Messalina, in loose attire, than in the
reserved and virtuous Lucretia?' . . . .The trouble is
that the court reasons logically, using an illogical
rule as its major premise. {Manning, 496 ff).
As we can see, the Abbot fJackson 'debate' over the character of
the rape victim is still being played out, over 100 years later.
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^^Few references to Abbot mention this seeming disjunction. An exception
is Charles P. Nemeth's essay, "Character Evidence in rape trials in
nineteenth century New York; Chastity and the admissibility of specific
acts," Women's Rights Law Reporter. Spring 1980, vol. 6, no. 3. Nemeth
notes that "further inspection of this opinion leaves the reader with
the impression that Justice Cowen distrusted loose women," (219, n. 22)
and that Cowen "seemed insulted that a woman whose reputation for
chastity was less than sanctimonious would dare beckon his court for a
remedy," (219, n. 23) but does not interrogate the issue further.
Nemeth, too, contrasts the opinion in Abbot with Justice Selah Strong's
opinion in Jackson, but concludes simply that "the Jackson decision was
a methodical and scholarly effort to apply the rules and decisions of
the day." (220) It seems to me that this conclusion, while acceptable on
a superficial level, merely skims the surface of rich interpretive
possibility.
53 "I don't want to prosecute;" a way of dismissing an indictment. For
example, if District Attorney Theron Strong wanted to try Orson Abbot
for assault before the Court of General Sessions, he should have said
that he did not want to prosecute Abbot for rape.
"Heard before the wrong court."
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As influential as Judge Cowen's opinion has been,
there is another thread besides Abbot at work in the history
of evidence rules in rape law. The New York Supreme Court,
in May, 1857, heard the case People v, Joseph Jackson .
Joseph Jackson and John Dixon were charged with the rape of
Catharine Sullivan, the assault allegedly taking place in
late August, 1856. Jackson and Dixon were convicted in the
Kings County Court of Oyer and Terminer. According to the
record, it was July, 1856, when Catharine Sullivan left
Liverpool for New York on the ship City of Brooklyn. While
on board ship, Catharine Sullivan was alleged to have had an
affair with a fellow passenger. Dr. Mason, an allegation
Sullivan denied. The counsel for the defense offered to
prove that this affair had taken place as evidence of
Sullivan’s "general bad character for c h a s t i t y , b u t the
Court of Oyer and Terminer refused to allow his evidence.
The court reporter's note is reproduced here:
On the trial of an indictment for rape it is
not competent, on the part of the defence, to
prove acts of illicit sexual intercourse
between the prosecutrix and persons other
than the defendant, although the prosecutrix
had previously been asked, on her crossexamination, in relation to such illicit
acts, and had denied them (a). (This case
overrules The People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192.)
Again, the point of law on which Abbot was decided had
nothing to do with the admissibility of evidence on the
60
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previous actions or character of the prosecutrix. Cowen's
opinion, however, had such force that the resonance of the
case was precisely on that issue. As I have previously
noted, the portion of the opinion that is obiter dictum
continues on for pages, while the procedural issue is
mentioned in two or three paragraphs at the very end of the
opinion. And Justice Selah B. Strong (cousin of Theron
Strong, the district attorney in the Abbot case) does not
necessarily disagree with Judge Cowen on the issue of the
complainant's character:
It is certainly right that the testimony of
the female preferring the complaint should be
subjected to the strictest scrutiny
compatible with the due administration of
justice; she is a necessary and generally the
sole witness of the transaction.(People v,
Jackson, 397)
Like Cowen, Selah Strong exhibits a great deal of
concern for the defendant, taking pains to note that in
rape cases men are at the mercy of women:
Experience has shown that the charge is
frequently unfounded and instituted from
impure motives. It is hard to meet the
testimony of a cunning and unprincipled woman
in reference to what is alleged to have taken
place in the presence only of herself and of
the accused, whose mouth of course is closed.
It is therefore deemed essential that the
charge should be supported by attending
considerations or circumstances, such as that
the witness is of good fame; that she
presently disclosed the offence and made
exertions for the detection and prosecution
of the offender; that she exhibited marks and
signs of the injury, and that the alleged
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outrage was perpetrated in a private or
secluded place. (People v. Jackson, 397)
Strong's list of conditions is a reminder that the
logistical and emotional difficulty of bringing charges
against a rapist has quite a long history. According to
Stephen Pistonio, in medieval society there were
six steps a woman was compelled to follow if
she wanted to bring her assailant to justice:
she must create a public outcry over the
crime as soon as possible, exhibit her torn
garments and bleeding to men of good standing
in the neighboring towns, explain the crime
to local law officials, make a formal
accusation at the first county court to be
held, repeat her accusation before the
coroners so that it could be taken down
verbatim for the public records and finally
prosecute the offender in the royal circuit
court as the earliest opportunity. (Pistonio,
271)
The medieval conditions are repeated in almost
identical fashion in Strong's opinion, although he does
not require that the alleged victim exhibit her
bleeding before the court.
Strong, however, introduces an exception into the
question of resistance when he suggests that threats
and intimidation are legitimate reasons to appear to
comply with a rapist:
It is absolutely necessary to the
constitution of the offence that the outraged
female should have resisted to the extent of
her power until the crime was consummated,
unless such resistance was prevented by
threats and intimidation. As the complainants
more frequently pervert the truth and are
harder to be met in reference to this
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particular than as to any other allegation,
courts have very properly allowed to the
defendants considerable latitude in proving
contradictory circumstances. {People v.
Jackson, 397)
By including the phrase "to the extent of her power" as
well as broaching the issue of potential "threats and
intimidation," Strong makes explicit his recognition of
the nature of the crime of rape.
Unlike Cowen, Selah Strong seems prepared to treat rape
as a violent crime, and one in which issues of power
and control play important roles.
And there is another important difference in the
way Strong and Cowen view women:
In any case, a single aberration from virtue,
in one whose general character for chastity
is otherwise unimpeachable, would raise so
slight an inference, if any, of nonresistance to a brutal outrage from a person,
or indeed to any one except him to whom she
had previously yielded, that it would not
justify a departure from the ordinary rules
of evidence. {People v. Jackson, 398)
For Cowen, as we have seen, one instance of
unsanctioned-by-marriage sexual activity was enough to
place a woman in the "tenant of the stew" category. Given
the burgeoning popularity of the religious revival movement
at the time, such linguistic equations may well have seemed
natural to h i m . S o m e t h i n g in the equation had changed,
however, by the time Justice Strong wrote the Jackson
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opinion.

In that opinion, Justice Strong responds to Judge

Cowen:
It is true that Judge Cowen, in the case of
The People v. Abbot (19 Wend. 192),
disapproves of the rule, strongly sustained
as it is by numerous judicial decisions and
the opinions of many elementary writers; but
the point was not necessarily raised in that
case, as the conviction was reversed on the
ground that the Court of General Sessions,
before which the trial for a rape had been
conducted, had no jurisdiction of the case,
and what was said by the learned judge as to
the rejection of the evidence was a mere
obiter dictum . (Jackson, 400)
Strong denied the motion for a new trial and instructed the
Court of Oyer and Terminer to "sentence the defendant
conformably to his conviction" (Jackson, 400). The decision
favorable to women, however, can be read as being perhaps
class-based, and is not cited as much as Abbot. I originally
read the tone of Strong's opinion as suggesting that not all
members of the bar regarded Judge Cowen's work in the same
favorable light. I think it is possible, however to read
Strong's opinion with deeper insight. Not only was Cowen's
opinion highly critical of District Attorney Theron Strong,
one of Selah Strong's many cousins, the bulk of the opinion,
that which Strong labels "mere obiter dictum,» had already
become part of an evolving body of thought on evidence.
Could Strong have been objecting to the molding of precedent
by dicta ?

There was, in Jackson, a set of complex

circumstances quite different enough from those in Abbot .
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Strong may well have felt that blindly applying Cowen's
words— no matter how learned and well-respected their
author, and regardless of whether he agreed with Cowen—
might have been inappropriate.
Yet it is certainly possible to locate examples of less
culturally-bound (or more humane and equality-minded) early
to mid-nineteenth century lawyers and judges, as I have
shown via the Jackson

case.

Linda Kerber has shown that

Daniel Davis, solicitor general, and James Sullivan, the
attorney general, who argued for the state in Martin v.
Massachusetts (1805), seem also to have been early
feminists. Sullivan's arguments for the state in this case
(which dealt with the seizure of a Tory loyalist couple's
property, the property rights of the wife's heirs, and the
wife's citizenship) were
congruent with the unusually consistent
liberalism he displayed throughout his
career. Believing that society was composed
of equal individuals, he spun out the
implications of that belief in a wide range
of issues as they presented themselves—
banking and the economy, religious freedom,
an end to slavery, and even gender
relations.
Davis and Sullivan undercut the concept of coverture, saying
that "the politicized woman did have 'a will of her own' for
which she was responsible and for which she could be
punished" (h^omen of the Republic, 134). The "Federalist
judges"(Women of the Republic, 135) did not buy this
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argument, and ruled, in effect, that Anna Martin could not
be viewed as a fully vested citizen, as one of her son's
lawyers, Theophilus Parsons, had argued (asking "'whether
the statute was intended to include persons who have, by
law, no wills of their own'"^®).

People V. Jackson, 392.
The influx of revival meetings in western New York State may not have
had a direct effect on every inhabitant, but the young Elizabeth Cady
was assigned "novels by Sir Walter Scott, James Fenimore Cooper, and
Charles Dickens, the rational philosophy of George Combe, and works
about phrenology" (Griffith, 21) by her brother-in-law in an effort to
offset distress brought on by attending revival meetings. I hope that
further research will allow me to expand on this point. Also,
"organizations for abolition, temperance, and Christian benevolence
flourished in upstate New York" (Griffith, 21): this may well be what
brought Orson Abbot to Sodus.
Linda Kerber, "The Paradox of Women's Citizenship in the Early
Republic: The Case of Martin vs. Massachusetts,” The American Historical
R eview, vol. 97, no. 2, April 1992, p.358.
Women of the Republic, 134. And see Kerber, "The Paradox of Women's
Citizenship in the Early Republic; The Case of Martin vs.
Massachusetts,” and "'She Can Have No will Different From His':
Revolutionary Loyalties of Married Women," pages 115-136 in Women of the
Republic, for a full discussion of the import of this fascinating case
and others which attempted to define women's status in the new republic.
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Abbot was a prosecution for assault and battery, and
rape. The woman in question was thirteen at the time the
alleged attacks began. She had no economic assets or wellplaced family connections to make her an important member of
the community. She was a servant, and a servant who had, in
the past, been unable to maintain her indenture obligations
to more than one family. Under the circumstances, there
seems to have been little opportunity for Philena
Morehouse's voice to be heard in Judge Cowen's court. Even
the various court reporters' versions of her testimony are
inflected by the choices they necessarily had to make, not
being tape recorders but human beings. Cynthia Jordan
remarks that
the texts left to us by the Revolutionary
generation both describe and employ a
language burdened with the multiple task of
breaking with past definitions, interpreting
the present in the interest of the public
good, and remaining flexible enough to
accommodate future reinterpretations.(510)
While the first two tasks seem immediately applicable to
Judge Cowen's opinion in the Abbot

case, his linguistic

choices strongly suggest a desire to resist rather than
accommodate "future reinterpretations,"59 and thus preserve
a cultural moment without the possibility of future
misreading.
Cowen's opinion can be read as representing the
philosophy of one man, to be sure, but the language he uses
67
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suggests that the modes and habits of thought that were
familiar to him, and which informed every word of the Abbot
opinion, were almost universally familiar to his
contemporaries as well. As Daniel A. Cohen notes in his
discussion of the influence of nineteenth-century trial
reports on the fiction of the time, "editors and lawyers not
only used sentimental language themselves but seemed to
assume that their mature neighbors were attuned to fictive
discourse as well."^®
Boundaries between fiction and non-fiction were
occasionally blurred in the nineteenth century, as they
occasionally are today, and the narrative of Cowen's opinion
might well have been deliberately constructed to resemble
other familiar contemporary texts. And this was by no means
a new phenomenon. The blurred boundaries are apparent in
late eighteenth-century fiction as well. Cathy N. Davidson
points out that "in the changing world of the turn of the
eighteenth century, many new readers wanted to read about
characters like themselves, characters with whom they could
identify and about whom they could fantasize."^1 Susanna
Rowson's Charlotte Temple, f o r

example, an extremely

popular novel of seduction and the subsequent— almost
immediate— dreadful ramifications thereof, seems to have had
roots in an actual unhappy seduction, Rowson's language
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shows her as being squarely in the tradition that produced
Esek Cowen.
For me, then, several big questions remain. What
influences led Judge Cowen and Judge Strong to have such
different opinions of women and women's sexuality?

Were

their views all that different, or is it simply that they
had different views of the importance of character evidence
in sexual assault cases— is it possible that Strong had an
equally firm dichotomy in mind but different courtroom
values? What role did other historical e v e n t s , i n c l u d i n g
the Seneca Falls Convention, have on the men who wrote these
opinions?
As I noted earlier, the boundaries between fact and
fiction were occasionally blurred. As the publishing
industry grew, and as more Americans learned to read, the
items available for their literary consumption began to
enter into the cultural vocabulary. It is important, then,
not to discount the influence of Samuel Richardson's
Clarissa: The History of a Young Lady
nineteenth-century

on literate

America. Richardson's novel was as

important an influence on white American women writers as
Charlotte Bronte or the Romantics. The novel, published in
1748, quickly became an important literary success.

As

Linda Kerber points out, Richardson's novel "offers sexual
adventure, but blames the heroine for it."(Women of the
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Republic, 249)

Both Pamela

and Clarissa

available and widely read by men and women.

were widely
It is not

surprising that aspects of the plots of these very popular
novels would become part of that culture's frame of
reference. Clarissa's rape, occurring as it did while she
was unconscious, provides an almost infinitely expandable
arena for a discussion of consent. And Lovelace’s attitude
draws on historical and Biblical precedent when he suggests
that he may be able to gain retroactive consent by
persuading Clarissa to marry

h

i

m

.

And, as Frances Ferguson

points out, "the rape becomes the vehicle for the contrast
between what could be said in public and proved and what is
said in private and believed."(99)

Implicit in Ferguson's

comment is a (perceived) difference between what is said in
public and what is said in private; this apparent
disjuncture in communication is visible in every prosecution
for rape. The vengeful or duplicitous woman who brings false
charges of rape springs from this split; her assumed
embodiment in every victim of rape may be an admission that
men and women speak differently about rape.
Women writers began to attempt a parallel discourse
around the middle of the nineteenth century and continue
t o d a y : t h i s alternative way of regarding women as sexual
beings was often heavily influenced by Gothic traditions and
thus rendered many books easily dismissible by critics as
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trashy or sentimental novels. What distinguishes these
alternative texts— both novels and the Jackson tradition of
rape case opinions— is that they allow the possibility of a
more humane reading of women's sexual experiences.
Elizabeth Stoddard's novel The Morgesons ( 1 8 6 2 ) is,
like Selah Strong's opinion in People v. Jackson, one
example of such an attempt at a parallel discourse.

The

novel, which met with little financial success, uses some of
the best-known women's novels of the day (including Susan
Warner's The Wide, Wide World ,

which was the best-selling

novel in the United States until the publication of Uncle
Tom's Cabin in 1862) as a starting point for its exploration
of the possibilities realistically available for a
nineteenth-century New England woman aware of her capacity
for sexual desire. Cassandra Morgeson, the protagonist,
struggles to create a place for herself in society without
denying the desire that is integral to her sense of self.
This effort leaves Cassandra scarred, both literally
and figuratively. But her scars are not entirely a source of
shame to Cassandra, and she describes them, accurately, as
wounds received in battle, even to a prospective suitor so
bold as to inquire:
I heard a low voice at my ear, and felt a slight
touch from the tip of a finger on my cheek.
"How came those scars?"
I brushed my cheek with my handkerchief, and
answered, "I got them in battle." {Morgesons, 173)
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This somewhat cryptic exchange turns out to be crucial to
Cassandra's ultimate choice of partner. Her growing
attraction to this man, Desmond Somers, is characterized by
her efforts to have him see her clearly, and to correct his
misreading of her past, initiated by their differing
definitions of "battle." Cassandra doesn't realize at first
that Desmond understands her to mean a battle to preserve
her chastity from a would-be ravisher. Once this becomes
clear to her, she takes pains to have him understand that it
was, in fact, a battle between her own desire and cultural
restriction; a battle that resulted in the accidental death
of her married cousin and lover Charles Morgeson.
Stoddard does not allow her heroine to draw a veil of
misunderstanding (and hence respectability) over her scars.
Rather it is Cassandra's struggle to maintain some kind of
honesty about her sexual desire that occupies the bulk of
the novel. Stoddard draws heavily on the Gothic imagery of
flowers and horses in representing Cassandra's desire, but
also uses Cassandra's relationship with the sea in a
particularly powerful set of images, most notably in a
exchange between Cassandra and her mother, with Cousin
Charles looking on:
Cousin Charles' hawk eyes caught the look,
and he heard me too, when I tapped her
shoulder till she turned round and smiled. I
whispered, "Mother, your eyes are as blue as
the sea yonder, and I love you." She glanced
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toward it; it was murmuring softly, creeping
along the shore, licking the rocks and sand
as if recognizing a master. And I saw and
felt its steady, resistless heaving,
insidious and terrible. {Morgesons, 63)

Stoddard links the sea and Cassandra's awakening sexuality.
She introduces issues of power and control in her
description of the sea "licking the rocks and sand as if
recognizing a master," and hints at the danger inherent, for
Cassandra, in any expression of sexuality, with the use of
the words "resistless," "insidious," and "terrible."
Stoddard's sensually-charged language is even more striking
when read against Esek Cowen's allusion-laden jeremiad.

It

seems almost impossible that Elizabeth Stoddard and Esek
Cowen were both writing about women in the northeastern
United States within a thirty year time period.
Cassandra's struggle with sexual expression and
cultural boundaries, I would argue, is Stoddard's effort to
add her distinctive voice to the ongoing discussion of
appropriate roles for women. Some women felt confined by
domestic roles, as did nearly all Stoddard's female
characters. Some women did not shy from experiencing and
expressing sexual desire, as some of her personal letters
suggest about Stoddard herself. In Stoddard's view, the
Republican Wife or Mother was an unrealistic, and possibly
unhealthy construct. The Morgesons is Stoddard's response to
the attitudes embodied in Judge Cowen's opinion.
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The influence Abbot and Judge Cowen have had on a
discourse of female sexuality is evident, as I have shown,
in contemporary prosecutions for rape. Even today, despite
efforts in some states to reform evidence laws regarding
rape cases, a woman's entire sexual history may well be part
of a discussion of her right to the court's protection. And
men and women still seem to speak different languages when
they discuss these issues. On a first reading, Cowen's
opinion leaped out at me, trained as I am to read through a
lens of feminist criticism, as anachronistic and appalling.
While Esek Cowen's dictum has had a far-reaching influence
on rape law, closer inspection reveals a long-standing
resistance to his reading of sexually active women, a
resistance by men and women, in media that included legal
opinions and fiction. The lengthy and discursive opinion in
People V, Abbot, then, offers a rare opportunity for
interpretation and contextualization, and an opportunity to
reexamine assumptions; it provides an avenue into a larger
understanding of the events and influences shaping rape law,
views of women as sexual beings, and the culture we inhabit.
S^And as far as reinterpretations are concerned, I must confess to a
feeling of some dismay upon reading that Philena Morehouse had been
caught attempting to make off with some of Mrs. Abbot's belongings on
the day she was removed from the Abbot household. In an all-toopredictable way I found myself both doubting her testimony and
constructing a complicated set of possibilities to justify her alleged
actions that Sunday.
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^^Daniel A. Cohen, Pillars of Salt, Monuments of Grace: New England
Crime Literature and the Origins of American Popular Culture, 1674— 1860,
New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Cathy N. Davidson, Revolution and the Word; The Rise of the Novel in
^ e r i c a . New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
The first American edition of Rowson's novel appeared in 1794; the
first British edition three years earlier.
®^As I searched for primary sources to fill in some of the missing
background in this case, it was brought to my attention that the Wayne
Sentinel, the weekly newspaper that would have covered the Abbot trial,
is available on microfilm from two libraries in Utah; Brigham Young
University and the Historian’s Office of the Mormon Church. Palmyra, New
York, (the county seat for Wayne County) turns out to be the site of the
annual Mormon celebration of Joseph Smith’s revelation. I hope to
investigate this source as I continue my research.
See Frances Ferguson, "Rape and the Rise of the Novel," in Misogyny,
Misandry, and Misanthropy, edited by R. Howard Bloch and Frances
Ferguson, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, (especially p.
102 and following) for an exploration of this theme, cunong others.
The "bad" mother continues to be easily identifiable by her sexual
activity— see Sue Miller, The Good Mother, for example.
Elizabeth Stoddard, The Morgesons and Other Writings, Published and
Unpublished, edited by Lawrence Buell and Sandra A. Zagarell,
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984.
Susan Warner, The Wide, Wide World, reprint edition New York: The
Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 1987.
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